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1 “Internes Can’t Take Money”
We are told that writing is mechanical, but now and then a story is writ-
ten from the heart, to make its mark upon the minds of men.
“Internes Can’t Take Money,” by Max Brand, is one of those stories.
Brand, whose real name is Frederick Faust, conceived this story of in-
ternes who are not allowed to receive fees for operations, while he was
lying on a hospital cot recovering from a serious operation.
He was grateful to those men in white who had served him and other
patients—so he wrote the tale of one of them to go down in history.1
The story about the 1936 ‹lm’s conception is only partly true, exagger-
ated by the Paramount Pictures publicity department to titillate the
public’s romantic inclinations. The publicists were right about one
thing, though: Here was a man in white who would go down in history.
For Internes Can’t Take Money was the ‹rst rumble in an avalanche of
Doctor Kildare offerings that would cover the American media for the
next forty years. Kildare inspired ‹fteen ‹lms, seven books, several mag-
azine short stories, a radio series, two television series (one network, one
syndicated), a few public controversies, and an uncounted number of
toys, lunchboxes, and shirts. The young doctor and his activities also
inspired the basic approach that network television producers were to
take toward a small army of ‹ctional physicians who followed him. The
beginnings of Doctor Kildare point to the roots of the formula. So while
theatrical movies are not the focus of this book, it does seem appropri-
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ate to start an examination of TV physicians by inquiring into the birth
of the one who set the mold.
Kildare in the Context of His Time
Just forty years before Internes Can’t Take Money was made, near the turn
of the twentieth century, it would have been inconceivable that a young
physician could become a popular culture hero. Before the twentieth
century, medicine was a sometimes near-subsistence occupation whose
practitioners had to ‹ght ‹ercely for legitimacy with a spectrum of other
contenders for control over human health. One reason was that physi-
cians often didn’t do any good, and too often did terri‹c harm.
At the turn of the 1800s, doctors had not progressed all that much
beyond their counterparts of the Middle Ages, who had practiced with
the aid of philosophy, myth, and prayer. The early nineteenth century
saw physicians in the U.S. and elsewhere employing a “therapeutic” sys-
tem that had no basis in any real understanding of the human body
and was not really therapy. Devised by the famous Philadelphia doctor
Benjamin Rush, it came from the belief that there was only one disease
in the world. According to social historian Paul Starr,
The one disease was “morbid excitement induced by capillary excite-
ment,” and it had but one remedy. This was to deplete the body by let-
ting blood with the lancet and emptying out the stomach and bowels
with the use of powerful emetics and cathartics. These stringent thera-
pies were to be used with courage. Patients could be bled until uncon-
scious and given heavy doses of the cathartic calomel (mercury chlo-
ride) until they salivated.2
“Heroic therapy” of this kind dominated American medical practice
in the ‹rst decades of the nineteenth century. Not only was it painful,
it was deadly. Bloodletting could weaken a sick person even more, and
calomel—which was used on anything from the plague to teething
pains—was a slow-acting poison that eroded the gums, teeth, and jaw.
One contemporary observer wryly described heroic medicine as “one of
those great discoveries which are made from time to time for the de-
population of the earth.”3
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The areas allied to medicine were no better. Surgeons—at the time
considered doctors’ helpers—had the status of being one step above
barbers. Their handiwork often led to severe infections and death. Hos-
pitals, too, were danger zones. During the Revolutionary War, Ben-
jamin Rush called them “the sinks of human life,” places where the
poor and the homeless went to die. The description applied well into
the nineteenth century. Trained nursing was virtually unknown. Hos-
pital nurses were often forced laborers taken from the local almshouse
or penitentiary.4
It isn’t hard to understand, then, why a great many nineteenth-cen-
tury Americans cringed at the thought of asking help from a physician.
“Regular” doctors looked on in chagrin as millions of people eschewed
them in favor of patent medicine vendors, who promoted sometimes
harmful elixirs for self-medication. Millions also turned to relatively be-
nign forms of healing—Thompsonianism, the Hygienic Movement,
Eclecticism, Homeopathy. While not necessarily more effective than
“regular medicine,” these approaches at least had the bene‹t of not
leaving the living patient permanently scarred and pained.
As a result, physicians often found it dif‹cult to make money. Many
founded schools with the aim of supplementing their of‹ce work with
the training of new doctors, who paid them directly for the training. Ac-
tually, calling these medical mills schools is to dignify them tremen-
dously. Large numbers were unclean, ill-equipped buildings or ›ats that
housed a few instruments and a few forlorn patients. But even the most
prestigious homes of medical learning had credibility problems. As late
as 1870, the dean of the Harvard Medical School explained the absence
of written examinations on the grounds that too few of the candidates
for graduation could write well enough to make such a test fair.5 This
was hardly the kind of comment that would lead people to place
con‹dence in the medical profession.
The prognosis for American medicine began to change slowly in the
late nineteenth century. A number of circumstances converged to greatly
increase physicians’ credibility. The most important was the decision by
leaders of the American Medical Association, state medical societies, ma-
jor medical schools, and major hospitals to hitch their profession’s star to
the rising success of science. Discoveries in bacteriology were picked up
by physicians who applied them to public health concerns, most promi-
nently the control of water-borne and food-borne diseases. Bacteriologi-
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cal research also led to cleaner hospitals as well as to antiseptic surgical
techniques. The resulting sharp reduction in hospital deaths (carried out
to a large extent by a professionalized nursing staff) was accompanied by
two other dramatic developments in bacteriology: the creation of a diph-
theria antitoxin in the mid-1890s and, in 1910, the concoction of “the
magic bullet,” the ‹rst major therapy against syphilis.
Physicians also used, and encouraged, development of a range of
new technologies during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
that allowed them to explore the body with more certainty. The stetho-
scope, ophthalmoscope, laryngoscope, microscope, x-ray, spirometer,
and electrocardiograph reduced the physician’s dependence on the pa-
tient’s ability to describe symptoms and diagnose problems. Just as
signi‹cant, they encouraged the patients to feel that the physician had
access to bodily changes that patients themselves could not detect.
With their new instruments, doctors could set standards of human
physiology, evaluate deviations, and classify individuals. For example,
the spirometer, which measures lung capacity, could be used by physi-
cians to judge physical ‹tness for military service.
Such capabilities did wonders to increase the legitimacy of “regular
medicine” in the eyes of the rest of society as well as to encourage
people’s dependence upon physicians. That was true even though doc-
tors still had little to offer in terms of speci‹c cures for particular ill-
nesses. And medicine’s potential for long-term cultural authority was
boosted even further from another direction—by an increased ability to
wield political power through the American Medical Association.
The AMA had actually been around since 1847. It was not until
about ‹fty years later, though, that it became a powerful representative
of medical interests. A number of brilliant moves led it to that position.
The organization was restructured to encourage more grass-roots sup-
port by physicians, thereby increasing its economic base. It invited
medicine’s traditional antagonists—the eclectics, the homeopaths, and
others—to join the AMA’s fold, thus eliminating the main sources of
professional rivalry. It encouraged the closing of most of the for-pro‹t
medical schools through its support of a Carnegie Foundation study
(the so-called Flexner Report) that recommended drastic reforms in
medical education. And it played an important role in making the pub-
lic aware of the dangers of patent medicines, an awareness that stimu-
lated the ‹rst Federal Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.
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From the standpoint of the AMA’s public image, the campaign
against those over-the-counter nostrums marked a turning point in
medicine’s ability to garner public support. It is not as if the medical as-
sociation was the loudest voice in condemning the public sale of dan-
gerous drugs; magazines such as the Ladies Home Journal with millions
in circulation took the lead. But what was remarkable was that the med-
ical profession bene‹ted from all the barbs that were hurled. A central
theme in the articles about patent medicines was that the reader should
go to a doctor to get help. For example, Collier’s magazine stated the fol-
lowing “moral” about patent medicine use: “Don’t Dose Yourself with
secret Patent Medicines, Almost all of which are Frauds and Humbugs.
When sick Consult a Doctor and take his Prescription: it is the only Sen-
sible Way and you’ll ‹nd it Cheaper in the end.”6
The years that followed saw the American Medical Association and
its af‹liated state medical associations extend and consolidate physi-
cians’ emerging social power. Having triumphed over their nineteenth-
century professional adversaries, they proceeded to put their own pro-
fessional house in the kind of order that would allow them to speak with
a consistent voice to society at large. Along with pruning the medical
schools, the AMA and state medical associations pushed through tough
state licensing laws around the country that limited medical practice to
doctors graduating from those schools. Within the profession, the med-
ical leadership negotiated the ways that the increasing number of spe-
cialists should practice and the ways that they should relate to general
practitioners. The specialists, in turn, organized into groups that would
protect their power within the profession and the society.
Collegiality rather than competition was encouraged, with the AMA
taking the role as the major resolver of disputes and the major presen-
ter of medicine’s face to society at large. Referrals from doctors were to
be the major route that patients would take to specialists, and “com-
mercialization”—advertising to the public or the blatant public market-
ing of services—was outlawed. In the drug market, over-the-counter
drugs, available directly to the consumer, were separated legally from
the more potent ethical drugs, available only by prescription from a
physician. At the same time, the increasingly powerful medical associa-
tions and medical specialty groups (by now, deserving the collective ti-
tle “organized medicine”) guided the relationship between hospitals
and doctors into an era that made physicians the captains of inpatient
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care and allowed them to use hospital equipment at no cost. (Patient
hospital fees and the communities that built the hospitals carried the
burden.)
So the profession that emerged through these and other develop-
ments cultivated a self-limiting number of elite practitioners, many of
them specialists, who were committed to the private practice of medical
care. It did not all come smoothly, or without anger in and out of the
profession. Medicine’s drastic house-cleaning and reorganization left in
its wake the demise of most schools that taught minority physicians
(they had closed as a result of the Flexner Report) and, eventually, the
downfall of large-scale commitments to general public health programs
as opposed to the individual patient’s health. Both developments left a
considerable hole in the nation’s health care net, especially during the
Great Depression of the 1930s, when large numbers of Americans could
not afford private medical care.
The AMA moderated its political stance slightly during the Depres-
sion. Physicians going hungry for lack of patients, along with leverage
on the part of the Roosevelt administration, encouraged medical lead-
ers to support government payment of indigent health care costs as a
temporary measure. But organized medicine made clear its insistence
that, in the long term, the dominant model of medical care in the
United States should be the private, fee-for-service relationship between
an individual and a doctor. Given the structure of medical education,
that doctor was very likely to be male, white, and Anglo-Saxon. In-
creasingly, too, he was a specialist who used the hospital and its expen-
sive technology as his workplace.7
It was a medical structure that was open to devastating criticism.
And, in fact, more than a few writers of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century had cast a cold eye on the emerging health care sys-
tem.8 In the 1930s, though, medical leaders worried most about depic-
tions in the nation’s most graphic medium, Hollywood movies. They
acknowledged that a number of important ‹lms—for example, The
Story of Louis Pasteur (1936), Men in White (1934), Private Worlds (1935),
and A Man to Remember (1938)—had shown a lot of respect toward
physicians and the advances of medical science.9 But too many others
posed major image problems for the profession, according to the AMA
and af‹liated societies.
By the late 1930s, organized medicine began to close ranks around
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movie depictions which its leaders felt harmed the profession. The
physician-critics hurled two kinds of objections in their public state-
ments. One was the concern that many motion pictures indulged in too
great a departure from reality. For example, a 1939 editorial in an AMA
magazine aimed at the general public agreed that “no doubt, for pur-
poses of drama, the writer and producer are warranted to take some li-
cense with pure fact.” Yet the editorial insisted that some of the greatest
medical feats could be ‹lmed effectively without exaggeration. And it
worried about the consequences of ‹lms such as Dark Victory (1939),
“the story of a doctor’s unsuccessful battle against death for the woman
he loves.”
In Dark Victory . . . the girl suffers with some sort of brain tumor, not to
be found in any of the records of . . . medical science. The public is given
the impression that after an operation for tumor of the brain the patient
may then be given a de‹nite time in which to live and that the recur-
rence will take place without any symptom except sudden loss of sight;
after that, death is supposed to follow in twenty four hours. This was
perhaps necessary for timing and emphasis in the drama but may give
many a patient with a brain tumor and the families of many such pa-
tients hours of unnecessary anguish.10
Still, the AMA admitted that despite these possible ill effects, the
popular Dark Victory was useful to medicine since it gave wide publicity
to “the ‹ne procedures which are the outgrowth of recent advances in
medical science.”11 As a result, medical leaders muted their criticism
and reserved their pointiest barbs for movies they considered destruc-
tive to physicians’ social status or to the fee-for-service system they were
working so hard to maintain. The AMA editorial reviewed these griev-
ances and was scathing in its denunciation of such ‹lms. It concluded,
in fact, that Hollywood had targeted the medical profession for criti-
cism. “The medical ‹eld,” it said, “has of late been more subject to pro-
paganda than any other type of motion picture dramatization.”12
The editorial singled out as examples two recent movies that had
particularly drawn ‹re from physicians around the country. In The
Citadel (1938), it said, the producers let themselves be used in the cam-
paign for socialized medicine. However, the editorial admitted, “this as-
pect of the picture was so completely confused . . . that few observers
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even remembered it.” In the second ‹lm, Doctor’s Diary, movie creators
indulged more effectively in what one medical society’s leaders called “a
malicious attack on the medical profession.” The critics insisted that
the ‹lm’s conception of the physicians’ code of ethics was absurd. They
said that the picture attempted to portray the staff of a private city hos-
pital as “an avaricious crew of vultures who are de‹ed by a tempera-
mental nurse and a heroic intern who is shot by the aggrieved mother
of a child prodigy during a suit for malpractice.”13
In the end, the editorial did hold out an olive branch to Hollywood
and implied that as a result of organized pressure more consistently
bene‹cial portrayals might be at hand. Many of the motion picture stu-
dios, it noted, had begun to use “competent consultants to assist them
in portraying medicine properly to the public.” So it hoped that motion
picture producers might yet channel the public’s interest in medicine
into an opportunity for “dramatic education” about disease and health
as well as for “the campaign for good medical service.”14 In fact, even
before the editorial reached the public, that hope was to be realized in
the creation of the doctor-hero Kildare.
Faust, Medicine, and the Kildare Image
It was almost as if Frederick Schiller Faust had volunteered for the job of
crystallizing the formula along lines favorable to medicine. If organized
medicine had been looking for a paid motion picture propagandist at
this delicate point in its history, it couldn’t have found a better person.
For one thing, Faust as a writer had an almost unbelievable ability to at-
tract millions of people to his material rapidly and repeatedly. With the
possible exception of dime novelist Gilbert Patten, he was the most
proli‹c writer that the United States has ever produced.15 He wrote un-
der at least eighteen pen names, partly because he often placed more
than one story in the same issues of a number of magazines at the same
time. He is perhaps best known as Max Brand, the name attached to the
Dr. Kildare titles as well as the westerns that include such classics as The
Untamed (1919) and Destry Rides Again (1939). He is estimated to have
published more than thirty million words during his lifetime, the
equivalent of at least 400 full-length books. And it is said that he sold
99 percent of everything he wrote.16
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Yet Faust was not valuable to physicians simply because he wrote
about doctors with rapid-‹re virtuosity. Philosophically, he was at one
with the science-driven, progress-oriented message that lay at the core
of twentieth-century medicine. Just as important, he was an idealist
who believed in looking for the best possibilities in American institu-
tions and individuals rather than attacking them. Robert Easton, his
son-in-law and biographer, recalled that when Faust ‹nished reading
Main Street, Sinclair Lewis’s hard-edged look at an American small town,
he slammed it shut and hurled it angrily to the ›oor. This was not the
world view that he thought writers should go to print with. Faust’s
work, Easton knew, stood for just the opposite.
Faust himself was a restless man with a zest for living well and a
great ability to turn out formula-driven ‹ction. In creating stories
around a doctor, he was not veering very far from those staple popular
culture formulas of the day, the western and the hard-boiled detective
tale. Obviously, the setting of the doctor tale was quite different from
locales that the cowboy and the private eye inhabited. Obviously, the
patterns of action that drove the western and the detective story could
not be the same as the doctor’s. The characters, too, were very differ-
ent—the former blue-collar types, the latter solidly white-collar.
At heart, though, Faust’s approach to the medical arena had impor-
tant connections with the older formulas. In his scheme of things, the
physician was as much a heroic individualist as were cowboys and de-
tectives. The patterns of action, revolving around threats to life and es-
cape from jeopardy, had strong borrowings from the cowboy’s West and
the detective’s gritty urban streets. And the hospital as Faust saw it was
as much a frontier setting, with its overtones of civilization and
progress hanging in the balance, as were the endangered towns in west-
ern stories and the gritty urban streets of detective ‹ction.
The way Faust came to know physicians and their work helps ex-
plain why he thought their profession was a good site for the celebra-
tion of untarnished, heroic ideals. He ‹rst got a look inside the medical
system as a stretcher carrier when he and his boyhood friend Dixie Fish
joined the Canadian Army during World War I. It didn’t lead to combat
(Faust actually left the military because he got bored), but the job gave
him a bird’s-eye view of basic hospital procedures.17
After the war, Faust and Fish ended up in New York. Faust got mar-
ried and began to sell the poetry and stories that he had been turning
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out at a rapid pace. His friend decided to go to medical school in the
city. When Fish interned at Roosevelt Hospital in the early 1920s, he of-
ten invited Faust there to watch operations. Faust also joined Dixie
when he visited charity cases and spoke with patients who were in trou-
ble with the police and the courts. The writer found it fascinating, and
he was eager to tag along.
A very different development started Faust on a chain of personal
encounters with medical professionals that lasted the rest of his life. He
had contracted the ›u after his army experience, and its effects lingered
in the form of a weak heart. The problem climaxed with a painful and
frightening “heart attack” in November 1921. Doctors diagnosed the
problem as ›uttering of the heart, and their advice was that Faust adopt
a slower lifestyle.
Knowing that it was impossible for him to rest, yet haunted by the
fear of collapsing at his typewriter or in a taxi, Faust sought the advice
of two well-known specialists, Evan Evans and Robert Halsey. They, too,
urged him to take it easy, to stop smoking cigarettes and drinking alco-
hol. When he insisted that these were impractical restrictions, they ac-
cepted his decision but decided to monitor his progress. Surprised that
he could indeed continue his hard living and hard writing, Evans and
Halsey wrote journal articles about his case.
Faust was seeing medicine at the top, and he was impressed. Lucky
enough to have a buddy who was becoming a distinguished urologist,
wealthy enough to afford the advice of renowned specialists even after
the Depression set in, Faust had no reason to question the direction in
which organized medicine saw itself moving. He felt thanks and he felt
awe.
From the standpoint of the doctor formula, it all came together in
1936, in the apartment of Faust’s agent, Carl Brandt. Faust mentioned
that the idea for a story about a young doctor had been percolating in
his mind for some time. He began recalling some of Dixie Fish’s experi-
ences as an intern at Roosevelt Hospital. Some of them dealt with the
underworld. When Faust mentioned that “interns can’t take money”
from patients whom they help, no matter who the patients are, Brandt
jumped to his feet and exclaimed, “There’s your title and there’s your
story.”18
“Internes Can’t Take Money” is about a poor, country-bred young
doctor named Jimmie Kildare. As the story opens, Kildare is having a
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beer at McGuire’s saloon. Two daily beers at the bar are Kildare’s only
real respite from the hospital. The intern—who is described as not good
looking, stylish, or very exciting—is thinking about his ‹nancial
dif‹culties. He marvels at bene‹cence of “the famous Doctor Henry
Fearson,” whose loans to Kildare have helped him survive. Suddenly, a
young man with a badly gashed arm enters and faints from shock and
loss of blood. Acting quickly, Kildare stops the bleeding, runs to the hos-
pital for necessary instruments and materials, sews up the wound, and
saves the man’s life. Soon he learns that the person he has saved is a
mobster. Offered a large sum of underworld money in payment, Kildare
replies that interns can’t take money. By the end, though, Kildare’s
sel›ess actions do yield a reward. It turns out that Dr. Fearson owes a lot
of money to the mob. He cannot pay, and his life is in danger. But the
mob leader, knowing that Fearson is Kildare’s mentor, rewards the in-
tern by canceling Fearson’s debt.
Faust’s agent sold “Internes Can’t Take Money” to Cosmopolitan
magazine for $800.19 Paramount bought the motion picture rights for
$5,000, a high sum for the day. Faust wasn’t involved with the screen-
play; the credits note the ‹lm as being “from a story by Max Brand.”
The main change was the addition of a romantic subplot. Kildare
(played by Joel McCrea) befriends hospital worker Janet Haley (Barbara
Stanwyck), a young widow who is searching for her abducted baby.
Still, the thrust of the story was Faust’s: altruistic young doctor suc-
ceeds in hard-boiled mob environment. Even more important, the
story’s name remained the one Faust had given it. The author had can-
nily placed the poverty of his intern at the center of his title and tale,
perhaps in an attempt to win audience sympathies for a medical pro-
fessional at the height of the Depression. Paramount’s publicity depart-
ment seems to have recognized this master stroke, for the movie’s press
kit emphasized the same thing.
The ‹lm and its publicists also picked up Faust’s subtle theme that
Kildare’s poverty had a purpose: the development of a noblesse oblige
approach to life. Here, the publicists declared, is “a story about an in-
terne—a student physician who, the law says, must toil ceaselessly in a
hospital for training at an average salary of $10 a month.” They im-
plied, as Faust had, that this real-life poverty was part of a test on the
road to success. A student physician’s suffering was the grindstone on
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which doctors honed their sympathy with human problems and crys-
tallized their obligation, even after attaining wealth, to help people in
need: “Thus it was that this tale of an interne, some day to win his spurs
as a great surgeon, refused to put money ahead of his duty—ahead of
his pledge to aid mankind and alleviate its suffering.”20
It was an idea that was to have lasting impact on the plots and char-
acters of the formula that developed through Kildare. The physician
was not to be seen simply as an educated individual who had learned a
valuable trade. Instead, he was to be seen as a member of a modern
elect: a contemporary knight whose painful movement through the
lists of training had shown that he had the heroic stature necessary to
link a compassionate nature to the wonders of healing technology.
The approach to setting that Faust and Paramount took would en-
dure, too. The studio committed itself to placing this theme of noblesse
oblige idealism against what the publicists called “true backgrounds.”
To simulate medical realism, technicians constructed a hospital set that
‹lled an entire sound stage. Kildare and company worked in a com-
pletely equipped ward room, outer room, waiting room, and operating
room. The director used real interns as extras “to give the production
proper background as far as personnel was concerned.” In addition, “so
that technical details in connection with the production would be per-
fect,” Paramount secured the services of Dr. John J. Toma, the chief res-
ident at Hollywood Hospital. Toma read the script before the ‹lming be-
gan and made sure that all speeches “were absolutely accurate.” He
supposedly ordered several changes made. He also studied miniatures of
all hospital sets and passed on them. Later he supervised their con-
struction on a large scale. “Every article seen in any part of the picture
pertaining to the medical profession was there by his advice and with
his approval.”21
The studio went even further in its claim of realism by associating its
hero with the profession.
Under Dr. Toma, McCrea, who has appeared in several other pictures in
the role of a physician, made a tour of Hollywood Hospital and watched
several operations performed. Dr. Toma was also on hand whenever any
scenes were taken which required technical understanding and dexterity.
These included two operations which McCrea performs for the camera.22
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But Paramount executives did not want to push their pride in the
‹lm’s medical realism too far for fear of alienating potential moviegoers
not interested in such details. Ultimately, they emphasized, the hospi-
tal and its surroundings ought to be seen as merely colorful trappings
for a story that was compelling by itself. The publicists cautioned ex-
hibitors and reviewers that Internes Can’t Take Money “is, under no cir-
cumstances, to be classed as a hospital picture, although the title may
imply it. It is, rather, the story of an interne, the story of a mother seek-
ing her child.”23
The combination of medical idealism, mob melodrama, and roman-
tic tear-jerker did seem to work for a lot of people when the ‹lm was re-
leased in 1937. The receipts were quite good,24 and reviewers’ comments
were not bad, either. Cue, for example, saw in the ‹lm “a fast-moving,
tense melodrama.”25
What Faust himself thought of the ‹lm, if he ever saw it (he was in
Europe when it was released), is not known. What we do know is that
the young intern stayed on his mind. He wrote a similarly ›avored
short story about Kildare titled “Whiskey Sour” for Cosmopolitan. And,
in early 1938, he generated the idea for a Dr. Kildare ‹lm series that cat-
apulted his character to the front ranks of popular culture.
Lassie, Andy Hardy, and Jimmy Kildare
The idea for a ‹lm series sprang out of Faust in the midst of personal
and professional turmoil. His marriage was reeling from his wife’s dis-
covery of his mistress. His income was dipping substantially from its
hundred-thousand-dollar mark in the late ’20s. He decided to travel to
Hollywood to seek both personal peace and more money. Touted by his
agent and publisher as a writer of prodigious rapidity as well as the best-
selling author in the U.S. and most of Europe, Faust signed an immedi-
ate contract with Metro Goldwyn Mayer for $52,000 a year. The studio
intended to use his mass-production abilities to produce the so-called B
or inexpensive pictures that were the company’s major money-makers.
At MGM, Faust ›abbergasted and frustrated executives by his ability
to spin out plot ideas virtually non-stop. They considered most of his
ideas vapid, but saw that every now and then he could come up with a
gusher. The Kildare idea came at the end of a dry spell. Faust was under
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pressure to develop a series concept for “B” picture producers Joe (“J.J.”)
Cohn and Carey Wilson.
The main considerations were these: MGM wanted a series that
could be as popular, upbeat, and family-oriented as the studio’s Lassie
and Andy Hardy ‹lms. The setting, characters, and subject matter had
to be robust enough to ignite a number of movies. And Cohn and Wil-
son were also interested in stories that could be developed around actor
Lionel Barrymore. Barrymore was severely arthritic with chronic hip
problems and hadn’t worked in over a year. But he was still under con-
tract to the studio and, not incidentally, he was Louis B. Mayer’s favorite
actor.26
As Faust saw it, MGM’s ‹rst concern “was to get a gripping new char-
acter in the hero, surrounded by intriguing and novel circumstances.”27
J. J. Cohn remembered that the writer pitched a number of series ideas
that did not appeal to him or Wilson. Then they hit pay dirt:
One day Carey Wilson came into my of‹ce and he said, “Max Brand has
an idea for a doctor who has cancer. And he’s a great doctor and he
wants to impart as much information as he can to his young assistant
before his time runs out.” And I said, “Well, you don’t have to go any
further.” And that’s when we did the ‹rst Kildare.
Faust wrote a more ›amboyant remembrance of the producers’ en-
thusiasm in a letter to his agent:
Finally, this morning, I gave Cohn and Wilson just what they wanted,
and they literally pranced around the room, Cohn clasping his hands
over his head and exclaiming, “We’ve got it! We’ve got it.” And Wilson
was inspired to say, “Shut up, Joe. Wait till you realize just what it
means.”28
What it really meant was the beginning of a cycle of ‹lms that
helped keep MGM king of both the “A” and “B” pictures through the
1940s, made Dr. Kildare a household name, and, in the process, rein-
forced and extended an image of the ideal role medicine should play in
society. At the time, though, the chores of assigning a director, choos-
ing a cast and ›eshing out a script were uppermost in the producers’
minds. For director, they chose Howard Bucquet, who had a reputation
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for getting the most out of low-budget pictures. The older doctor’s role
was clearly Lionel Barrymore’s. He wanted badly to resume acting and
was ecstatic when Cohn and Wilson told him that he could do the role
in a wheelchair.
Lew Ayres, a sensitive twenty-nine-year-old contract actor, was
tagged for the Kildare role. Ayres had been making a tenacious come-
back after years of not being able to live up to the promise he had
shown in the 1930 classic All Quiet on the Western Front. He took the role
with little enthusiasm, though. His ambition was to become a respected
character actor. Now he was in danger of becoming a continuing ‹xture
in what he feared would become a “C”-picture series if it succeeded at
the box of‹ce. Still, it was clear to all on hand that Ayres and Barrymore
were clicking as a pair in their new roles. So the studio shot an unusual
closing scene for the movie. In what amounted to an epilogue, Ayres
and Barrymore appeared on a stage and announced that they would be
returning together in a series of Kildare ‹lms.29
Based on a plot by Faust, MGM writers Willis Goldbeck and Harry
Ruskin wrote the screenplay for that ‹rst movie, Young Dr. Kildare. The
story starts with Dr. Kildare returning to his small hometown. He has
his medical degree, and his parents expect that he will join his country-
doctor father in practice. Instead, Kildare politely tells them that he
feels he must continue his medical training to ‹nd his own place in the
scheme of things. He joins Blair General Hospital as a $20-per-month
intern. Dr. Leonard Gillespie, a brilliant diagnostician who is looking to
impart his knowledge to the next generation, sees a great future for the
young physician. But because of the continual caustic remarks that the
older man makes, Kildare believes that Gillespie dislikes him.
Kildare shows his intelligence and tenacity in the case of Barbara
Chanler, the daughter of wealthy parents. An expert physician had de-
clared the girl unbalanced. After speaking with her, though, Kildare is
convinced that she has a legitimate basis for her mental problems. He
investigates the problems in her past, discusses them with the young
woman, and in this way brings her back to a normal emotional state.
Nevertheless, the hospital’s administrator, Dr. Walter Carew, is prepared
to dismiss Kildare on grounds of insubordination. The intern prepares
to return home, but Gillespie, who appreciates Kildare’s talents, chooses
him as his new assistant.
At the start of production, someone at MGM became nervous that
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the name Kildare sounded too much like “dare to kill.” They contem-
plated changing the name, and Faust agreed, but then decided against
it because of the recognition that the character already had.30 In the
end, though, the studio showed a lot of faith in the ‹lm by arranging its
New York debut in the prestigious Radio City Music Hall.
Like their Paramount counterparts on the ‹rst Kildare ‹lm, MGM’s
publicists took care to advise the audience that Young Dr. Kildare was not
overly concerned with the speci‹cs of hospital work. Posters and print
announcements stressed that the plot had the elements that lured mil-
lions to movies—romance tangled with the struggle of life over death.
The publicists spared few of the standard adjectives to herald the ad-
venture and mystery that surrounded the ‹lm’s men of American med-
icine. “While sirens scream [the ads said] . . . and adventure lies ahead 
. . . ride with the ambulance interns of a great hospital! Learn the secrets
of Men in White and the Women they love . . . in the split-second drama
of “Young Dr. Kildare” . . . and the mystery of the girl in Sables!”31
The public responded enthusiastically at the box of‹ce. Newspaper
and magazine critics also tended to like the ‹lm. Much mention was
made about the entertaining relationship between the earnest Ayres
and the curmudgeonly Barrymore. It is interesting that Metro released
its critical look at the medical profession, The Citadel, just a few months
after it distributed Kildare. From the studio’s perspective, the two were
very different. Kildare, the offspring of pulp ‹ction, had the clear ear-
marks of bread-and-butter series output. The Citadel, by contrast, was a
prestige ›ick. Filmed in England and based on a best-selling novel, it
was touted as “MGM’s greatest production.”32 The handling of The
Citadel by the studio and the press was much more sober than that of
Young Dr. Kildare.
But a Time magazine review treated the two as a package and argued
that Jimmie Kildare was in some respects a U.S. counterpart to The
Citadel’s hero. Like the latter ‹lm, the review said, Young Doctor Kildare
champions the ideals of medicine by centering on a physician who
wades through medical iniquities. “Scrambling about a Manhattan hos-
pital to see where he can do the most good, Dr. Kildare encounters his
full quota of mercenary internes and self-important specialists, but he is
also privileged to deal with Dr. Leonard Gillespie (Lionel Barrymore)
who, old, morose, and dying of cancer, is still all that a great diagnosti-
cian should be.”33
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Film historian Lewis Jacobs, writing in 1939, went even further. He
saw The Citadel and Young Dr. Kildare as part of a cycle of ‹lms that were
re›ecting heightened public and government criticism of the “social ir-
responsibility” in parts of the medical fraternity. Hollywood, he said,
had been stimulated by growing national agitation for “various social-
ized institutions” and by “the federal government’s attack on the Amer-
ican Medical Association as a trust.” To support the point, he latched
onto elements in several pictures that illustrated what he saw as pro-
gressive pattern of negative depictions of the physician in society.
From Arrowsmith (1931), the story of a small-town physician and of the
medical scientist’s dilemma of a choice between the immediate relief of
sufferers and the eventual immunity from disease for all mankind,
movies have advanced to Bedside (1934), which exposed the seamy side of
medical science and the racketeering prevalent in some medical quarters.
A Man to Remember (1938) recounted the life of a small-town doctor
who is confronted with bigotry and lack of understanding support: de-
spite his practical human experience, because of his lack of degree he
cannot continue his investigation. Men in White, The Young Doctor Kil-
dare, Yellow Jack, Dr. Monica, Main Street, and Of Human Bondage revealed
other professional, economic, and ethical problems faced by the doctor.
The Life [sic] of Louis Pasteur re-evaluated the great scientist’s work in the
light of social and political pressure that was exerted to frustrate him.
The culmination of the exposures of the medical profession came with
The Citadel (1938), in which not only a protest against injustice but a de-
mand for a new order of things was clearly voiced.34
Organized medicine, though, read the whole thing rather differ-
ently. As we have noted, medical leaders ripped angrily into what they
saw as The Citadel’s militantly socialistic intentions for medicine. On
the other hand, they were much more sanguine about Arrowsmith and
A Man to Remember. Their attitude toward the goings-on in Blair General
Hospital fell into the latter category. Young Dr. Kildare ignited no printed
comments in medical trade journals. But Calling Dr. Kildare, the second
in the series, was lauded by the AMA for scenes realistically depicting
the joys as well as the travails of internship.35 The association did take
that ‹lm to task for getting Kildare involved in murder-related detective
work. Yet this was a cavil like the kind directed at Dark Victory. The AMA
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seemed to be saying that dramatic license at the expense of medical re-
alism was a problem, but not nearly as great a problem as negative de-
pictions of the institution’s structure.
As for the people at MGM’s Kildare unit, they saw themselves pro-
ducing a ‹lm series that was respectful to medicine at its core. Producer
Joe Cohn recalled that one of MGM’s mandates regarding Kildare was
“to be fair to the medical profession.” To him and other studio execu-
tives, fairness did not mean that every doctor had to be the model of
skills and honesty. Rather, it meant that the central characters had to
contradict medical evils by portraying the possibilities, the ideals, of
American medical practice.
It is unlikely that organized medicine was ever directly involved in
guiding this approach. Neither Joe Cohn nor Lew Ayres could remem-
ber the AMA or any similar group getting in touch with anyone on the
series. Organized medicine really didn’t have to do that. In Louis B.
Mayer’s studio during this period, it was a dictum that “B” pictures were
to be idealistic, uncontroversial, conservative. If Andy Hardy’s father
was the incarnation of the honest American lawyer, if Lassie was the in-
carnation of the loyal American dog, then Jimmie Kildare had to be the
embodiment of the greatness in American medicine.
Cohn pointed out that not only did his writers have to be generally
respectful toward the medical profession, he and Wilson had to ensure
the technical accuracy of the procedures that were shown. That did not
rule out dramatic license in depicting diseases and their cures. An as-
sumption of the storytellers was that as long as something was possi-
ble—even if it wasn’t probable—it could be used. But to make sure that
the plot was indeed possible and to warrant that procedures were au-
thentic, Cohn and Wilson did hire a physician as a continuing advisor
and brought in specialists every now and then.
The importance of this technical realism was never questioned.
Cohn equated it with cinematic honesty: “First, you have to imbue
these things with a degree of integrity. And somehow or other if you
don’t practice integrity, there seems to be a false premise and the ‹rst
thing you know is you fall on your ass. The audience can feel it, the doc-
tors will jump on it.”
Still, Cohn and Wilson insisted on the same principle that had
guided the producers of Internes Can’t Take Money: despite the emphasis
on accuracy, a Kildare ‹lm had to go beyond the drama of medical tech-
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nology. The producers’ belief from the start was that Blair General Hos-
pital should serve as a broad stage for examining human relations. And,
in fact, they considered a hospital a terri‹c locale for a human relations
approach. As Cohn put it, “When you’re dealing with life and death,
when a mother comes in and says, ‘My child is dying,’ where can you
‹nd a better situation?” Note the gender here. The central ‹gures in dis-
tress did tend to be women.
Most of the elements that were to comprise the Kildare movies
could be seen in Young Dr. Kildare and its immediate successor, Calling
Dr. Kildare. Blair General Hospital stood squarely at the center of things.
Moving through Blair were several regulars aside from Kildare and Gil-
lespie: Jimmie’s dad, Dr. Stephen Kildare; Jimmie’s mother, Martha Kil-
dare; Blair administrator Dr. Walter Carew; Gillespie’s gruff but lovable
nurse, Molly Byrd; Kildare’s sweetheart, nurse Mary Lamont; and, for
comic effect, ambulance driver Joe Wyman and his gossipy girlfriend,
Sally the switchboard operator.
Several plot patterns that became conventional were there at the
start as well: Kildare’s insistence on sticking his neck out to help a physi-
cian or patient (or both) in the face of a dif‹cult medical and/or per-
sonal problem; bureaucrat Carew’s (futile) threats of disciplinary action
against the talented but unorthodox intern; Gillespie’s obstreperous-
ness toward Kildare but his eventual display of affection and pride in
Kildare’s ability and humaneness.
The doctor’s impoverished status as an intern was also a recurring
theme, most prominent in his inability to marry Mary for lack of funds
to support both of them. Kildare displayed a high-minded reluctance to
ask any woman to play second ‹ddle to his career, and so he kept his
pursuit of Mary low-key. Over and over it was emphasized that Kildare’s
noble dedication to healing transcends personal love. In Dr. Kildare’s
Strange Case (1939), for example, Kildare risks losing Mary to a wealthy
surgeon and forgoes a ‹ve-hundred-dollar-a-month research position at
the prestigious Messinger Institute to stay at Blair (for $20 a month) and
hone his skills as a “diagnostician” with Gillespie, whom he hopes some
day to succeed.
The doctors’ concentration on medical diagnosis allowed the writers
to incorporate detective work and psychological drama into their plots.
Hard-boiled detectives were a Depression ‹lm favorite, and, Faust noted
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slyly, “there are as many Kildare stories as there are detective stories that
can be given a medical twist.”36 Kildare’s occasional performance of
skillful surgery in Blair’s impressive operating theater added an aura of
high technology to the proceedings. Peppering every ‹lm were com-
ments—often by the hortatory Gillespie—about the nature and role of
the physician in American society.
Dr. Kildare’s Strange Case is as good a ‹lm as any to highlight these
comments. Basic to Gillespie—and to the series—is the idea that a
physician is born, then shaped. (“You are a born doctor,” he scolds Kil-
dare. “Use your eye, heart, brain, instincts.”) Ever mindful of eternal
verities, Gillespie knows that, ultimately, whether a person lives or dies
“is up to heaven.” Still, he and Blair’s other doctors believe that as
physicians’ knowledge progresses, they must work constantly, even dic-
tatorially, to keep patients alive. When a desperately ill patient refuses
an operation, Kildare forces it on him and is vindicated by Gillespie
even though the patient dies on the operating table. “That patient had
one chance in a hundred of getting through the operation,” blusters
Gillespie, “and one chance in a thousand of living without it! We’d be
pretty poor doctors if we didn’t do anything humanly possible.”
Doing anything humanly possible even extends to dictating the per-
sonal morality and life-styles of patients. For instance, Gillespie, con-
cerned about the blood pressure of a ‹ftyish man, berates his patient for
“living too young.” He urges the man to leave his mistress and return to
the quiet of his family.
Reviews of the Kildare ‹lms in both the general and the trade press
recognized the predictable patterns that acted out these ideas about the
doctor’s wide-ranging potential and jurisdiction. They reported the pat-
terns matter-of-factly and implied that the audience picked them up
too. Time magazine said admiringly that the “professionally precise” se-
ries had a “tried and true” formula that was “furnishing satisfactory en-
tertainment to U.S. cinemillions.”37 And the politically liberal Common-
weal encouraged readers to see Dr. Kildare Goes Home (1940). Its reviewer
avoided Lewis Jacobs’s procrustean tendency to label doctor ‹lms of the
1930s as ‹tting into a cycle of anger about the medical profession. The
review said that the movie entertained by predictably invoking com-
fortable verities and progressive dreams to an audience whose world
had turned inside out:
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. . . Dr. Kildare Goes Home is so full of the milk of human kindness and
worthy ideas on socialized medicine that it deserves your attention. Fur-
thermore, we see so little of Lionel Barrymore these days that his return
to the screen . . . is most welcome. Stressing again that the doctor’s busi-
ness is alleviation of pain and postponement of death, this continuation
of the Kildare series takes Dr. Ayres to his home town where he starts a
clinic with three unemployed young doctors and makes some intelli-
gent statements on preventative medicine. Dr. Barrymore also growls a
few sane remarks on marriage and its purpose that come as a surprise
considering the ›ashy kind of escapist entertainment that Hollywood is
dishing out in these hectic postwar, prewar, war days.38
It was clear to culture-watchers that the young physician had struck
a sympathetic chord among the American public. In Los Angeles, the
movie’s technical advisor found his medical practice swelling so much
after word of his ‹lm involvement got out that he could no longer con-
sult for the studio. People wanted to call on Dr. Kildare’s doctor.39 In
fact, “Calling Dr. Kildare,” the title of the third ‹lm (1939), became a
popular cliché. Even radio performers such as Jack Benny used it to get
an easy laugh.
So Metro’s Kildare factory was run in high gear. As was the fashion
with hit series, the studio required on-screen and behind-the-screen
personnel who had started with the show to stay with it. The same cast,
the same director (Bucquet), and the same screenwriters (Ruskin and
Goldbeck) worked on the ‹rst nine movies in the bunch. Faust himself
plotted six of those ‹lms, paying his personal physician for advice on
the medical portions. In addition, he created short stories and novels
about Jimmie Kildare that never made it to the screen but helped fan
the public’s interest in the young physician. In one optimistic letter to
his agent he wrote, “I have the feeling the Kildare stories can be made
to last inde‹nitely.”40
Two Crises
In 1941, though, the well-oiled Kildare engine began to falter under two
crises. The ‹rst started when Larraine Day, who played Kildare’s Mary,
told the front of‹ce that she wanted to go on to bigger things. Day felt
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sti›ed on the Kildare treadmill. She wanted meatier roles and she wanted
them in “A” pictures. Louis Mayer kept putting off her requests, but she
was so dogged that Carey Wilson ‹nally agreed to arrange her departure.
For Day, it would ultimately mean leaving MGM in search of better parts.
But what to do with Mary? After careful consideration—and perhaps
re›ecting their anger at the actress—Metro’s top brass decided to have
her killed. More than that, they agreed to the most melodramatic time
possible, her wedding day. The title of the ninth ‹lm, Dr. Kildare’s Wed-
ding Day (1941), encouraged the sunny thought that Kildare, who had
graduated from the poverty of internship to become Gillespie’s assis-
tant, would ‹nally marry Mary. Fans were sorely disappointed. Instead
of seeing the couple off on a honeymoon, they saw Mary get run over
by a truck a few hours before the nuptials. And, they watched her die af-
ter telling her bereaved ‹ancé, “This is going to be much easier for me
than it is for you. Poor sweet Jimmie.”
Predictably, Kildare’s creators found a way to tie the melodramatic
death to a medical theme. Kildare’s loss turned into a powerful message
about the physician’s obligation to subordinate his personal problems
to the needs of his patients. Variety phrased it well:
The shock, the bereavement, threaten to halt the career of the brilliant
young medico. The old doc [Gillespie], with much guile as well as ‹nally
with honest appeal and recital of a parallel tragedy in his own life,
brings his protege back to hospital labors. Sad, the story, but uplifting
and inspiring in its devotionals and the subordination of personal af-
fairs to a creed.41
Ironically, it was an actor’s subordination to a very different creed
that sparked the second crisis, with an altogether less satisfactory end-
ing for those involved. In 1942 Lew Ayres informed his draft board that
he was a conscientious objector to armed combat in World War II. The
actor who had gained initial fame for his anti-war portrayal in All Quiet
on the Western Front said that from childhood he had espoused a “Chris-
tian doctrine of non-resistance to evil.” He believed ‹rmly, he said, in
the doctrine’s “world healing possibilities.” He offered instead to do
non-combatant service in the Medical Corps; he had experience work-
ing with the Red Cross in Los Angeles. That was refused initially. Ayres
was sent to an Oregon labor camp for conscientious objectors.42
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A New York Times editorial of the day observed that it took a lot of
courage for someone as famous as Ayres to hold that position in the
midst of the nation’s most patriotic war.43 But the ‹lm industry wasn’t
as understanding. Executives at Metro feared that Ayres’s paci‹stic
stance would affect business. There were some early signs in different
parts of the country that this was so. For example, in Hackensack, New
Jersey, the Fox Theater manager said he withdrew the newest Kildare
‹lm, Dr. Kildare’s Victory, after receiving more than a hundred telephone
calls threatening a theater boycott if it were not removed from the dou-
ble bill.44 Believing that a trend was developing, MGM president
Nicholas Schenck huffed, “Lew Ayres is washed up with us since he’s
washed himself up with the public.”45 Variety, fueling the ‹re in a front-
page editorial, labeled the actor “a disgrace to the industry.”46 Some ex-
hibition chains began to cancel ‹lm bookings of all existing Lew Ayres
‹lms.47
But it soon became evident to MGM executives that they had over-
reacted. For one thing, the company had more than one million dollars
invested in ‹lms starring Lew Ayres, and it made little economic sense
to dismiss them so abruptly. So, it did not take long for Metro execu-
tives to announce that they had conducted an “impartial” and “com-
prehensive” survey of public opinion in theaters around the country
and found little resistance to Ayres ‹lms. A studio of‹cial even sug-
gested that the public had shown more tolerance in the matter than
had theater executives.48 Accordingly, the three Kildare ›icks that were
making the theater rounds at the time continued to be shown.49
Yet MGM was ‹rm that no other movies with the actor be made.
Substituting someone else as Kildare was out of the question; studio ex-
ecutives felt that Ayres was irrevocably identi‹ed with the doctor in the
mind of the audience. So the next installment in the medical series,
which had already begun shooting, was reshaped at a cost of $100,000.
The screenplay was rewritten; Kildare references were removed; and the
central character was transformed into a Dutch physician.50
Frederick Faust, whose un‹lmed Kildare scenarios would have to
submit to the same fate or go unused, was initially furious that the ac-
tor who played his heroic medico should refuse to bear arms. His re-
sentment cooled as he learned that Ayres did eventually join the Army
Medical Corps, serving courageously as a non-combatant under ‹re
during a number of Paci‹c beachhead invasions. Ironically, it was as a
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non-combatant in the Second World War that Faust met his own end.
He got involved as a correspondent for Harper’s magazine. Unarmed ex-
cept for a club cut from an olive tree, the ‹fty-two-year-old writer was
shot in the chest while advancing with troops during the 1944 invasion
of Italy.
Two years before that, MGM executives had decided how to salvage
their lucrative medical series. The idea was to let it go on by keeping the
same cast (sans Ayres) and using Dr. Gillespie (Lionel Barrymore) as the
central character. With direct creative control remaining with Cohn,
Williams, Ruskin, and Goldbeck, the ‹ve Gillespie ‹lms that emerged
from 1942 through 1947 were similar in approach to the Kildare install-
ments. Each movie’s three subplots allowed the interweaving of med-
ical mystery (amnesia, mental illness) with melodrama. These were
punctuated liberally with scenes in which Barrymore growled comically
at the hospital staff, interns (especially Van Johnson in four pictures
and the Chinese actor Keye Luke in ‹ve), and a succession of patients
(most often women or children). The proceedings also gave Gillespie
several opportunities to perorate along established lines about the role
of the physician in society. In Dark Delusion (1947), for example, the old
man reminds a young physician falsely accused of malpractice that the
public has the right to demand a lot of the medical profession:
Who’s ever fair to a doctor? Does your Hippocratic Oath guarantee that
your patients are going to be fair to you? Or does it just obligate you to
be fair to them? And remember: A doctor must sink or swim; he must
quit or carry on. And a good doctor should always have the courage to
make that decision!
Dark Delusion marked the last ‹lm in the Gillespie series. Two years
later, though, MGM mined its Kildare lode in yet another way. With
Ayres back from the war and looking for work, the studio teamed him
and Barrymore in a syndicated half-hour radio series, The Story of Doctor
Kildare. It retreaded the Blair General Hospital routines yet again. This
time, though, the cast was new aside from Ayres and Barrymore. The pro-
duction staff was also new, and writing was done on a freelance basis.
The introduction opened with the announcer shouting, “The Story
of Doctor Kildare,” then shifted to Ayres reading the Hippocratic oath.
“Whatsoever house I enter, there will I go for the bene‹t of the sick, and
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whatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of men, I will keep
silence thereon, counting such things to be held as sacred trusts.” The
announcer, reclaiming the mike, called the program “an exciting, heart-
warming series.” He then described the setting: “Blair General Hospital,
one of the great citadels of American medicine. A clump of gray-white
buildings planted deep in the heart of New York, the nerve center of
medical progress, where great minds and skilled hands wage man’s ever-
lasting battle against death and disease. Blair General Hospital: where
life begins, where life ends, where life goes on.”
The stories that followed were not nearly as exciting or literate as the
introduction implied. The writers typically set a melodramatic situation
with a medical pretext—an asthmatic orphan, a fainting truck driver,
Kildare needing to perform emergency surgery on himself—against at-
tempts at comedy that took Barrymore’s blusterings to even greater
lengths than the Gillespie ‹lms did. Ayres, who believed that the Kil-
dare ‹lms were “soapy,” thought the radio show was even more so, even
though he wrote a few of the episodes.
The series held on until 1952, but it never ignited anything like the
public enthusiasm that the ‹lms had sparked. Still, a generation had
come to know the pathways and ideals of modern medicine through
the eyes of Jimmie Kildare. Moreover, a formula of popular culture had
crystallized. The setting was the large metropolitan hospital, a place
where a Grand Hotel of interesting patients could reasonably show up.
The main characters were two physicians, a neophyte and an older sage,
with nurses, orderlies, and the hospital administrator revolving around
them.
The patterned plots acted out themes that both glori‹ed establish-
ment medicine and placed heavy responsibilities on it. Doctors were so-
ciety’s champions in the modern struggle against death from disease. The
public had the explicit right to demand a lot from their scienti‹c war-
riors. Physicians had to do all that was possible, even in the face of per-
sonal sacri‹ce, to help patients. And they had to know the importance of
getting professionally immersed in patients’ problems, of showing that
they care even while using increasingly impersonal technologies.
These depictions ‹t the perspective that the American Medical As-
sociation wanted to convey about the health care system. As the orga-
nization most involved in reshaping the structure and image of Ameri-
can medicine in the early twentieth century, the AMA was clearly
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interested in media visions that would help its cause. Yet, as we have
seen, the creation of Jimmie Kildare was not a direct result of promo-
tional efforts by any part of the medical establishment. It was, in its
most basic sense, the formularized response to a storytelling need by a
proli‹c American writer whose path happened to cross medicine’s.
At the same time, the impetus for the Kildare formula cannot be laid
fully at the feet of an independent creator. Frederick Schiller Faust was
clearly in›uenced by his era’s public messages about medical science,
perceptions that the AMA and its af‹liates were working to mold. Just as
clearly, producers at Paramount and MGM were quite concerned with
staying in tune with the medical establishment when it came to depict-
ing health care heroes.
This concern re›ected the studios’ general policy toward institu-
tions in their pictures, a decision to swim with the mainstream when it
came to matters of professional portrayal. In Metro Goldwyn Mayer’s
case, it seems that caution about offending organized medicine was also
a speci‹c response to the AMA’s public anger about previous ‹lms. AMA
‹lm critiques seem to have reinforced the producers’ decisions to stay in
the medical establishment’s good graces when it came to a bread-and-
butter ‹lm series.
A convergence of a number of mainstream interests at a particular
point in time, then, served to cultivate Kildare and catapult him onto
the nation’s screens. A decade later the Kildare name would attract even
larger numbers to a television version of Blair General Hospital. In the
meantime, though, as the movies and radio gave way to television as
the nation’s most shared storyteller, a creator with some similar inter-
ests to Faust would try to place his own stamp on the form. The upshot,
the most popular doctor show of the 1950s, would try to push medical
storytelling in what its creator felt was a very different direction from
the course Faust had set.
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